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The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed
to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is defined
on a random network with agents as nodes and games along the links. The agents change their neighborhoods
to improve their payoff. The system relaxes to stationary states corresponding to cooperative Nash equilibria
with the additional property that no agent can improve its payoff by changing its neighborhood. Small pertur-
bations of the system lead to avalanches of strategy readjustments reestablishing equilibrium. As a result of the
dynamics, the network of interactions develops non-trivial topological properties as a broad degree distribution
suggesting scale-free behavior, small-world characteristics, and assortative mixing.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 89.65.-s
Economic relationships evolve: If the fish you bought on
the fish market is spoiled you will probably switch the dealer
next time. On larger scales, markets may develop into com-
plex interaction structures solely from agents using their free-
dom of choosing their partners.
Statistical physics has a tradition of studying systems of in-
teracting agents motivated by economic or social interactions.
One example is evolutionary game theory on the lattice where
agents can be thought of as particles with generalized interac-
tions and internal memory. These properties give rise to com-
plex spatiotemporal dynamics when agents try to locally opti-
mize their payoffs [1, 2, 3]. The goal of this paper is to relax
a further constraint in this class of models, namely the fixed
interaction topology. Agents may use the choice of interaction
partners as another means to locally optimize their payoff and,
thereby, shape the interaction matrix and the topology of the
system.
An interesting aspect of agent systems with evolving neigh-
borhoods is the structure of the emerging interaction net-
works. The theoretical physics community has focused on
complex network structures in diverse natural systems re-
cently [4, 5]. Game theoretic models on evolving networks
may provide a fresh view on the emergence of complex net-
works in systems where strategic interactions occur. One ex-
ample are economic systems where complex global structures
and dynamics are observed [6, 7].
The dynamics of games on static networks has been stud-
ied recently, namely the question of stability of cooperative
behavior in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [8, 9, 10],
also under the influence of noise in the spatial relationships
of agents [11]. The question how the game itself may affect
network topology was asked by Zimmermann et al. in a sim-
ple setting of cooperating and defecting players, leading to
a network that self-organizes into a steady state with highly
connected cooperators [12].
In the following, let us consider the IPD with memory on
an evolving network. Details of this game on static networks
can be found in Ref. [10]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma [13, 14] is
History Action
0 1
1 1
First move 1
TABLE I: Representation of an agent’s strategy (0, defection; 1, co-
operation). A player with the above strategy cooperates, no matter
whether its opponent has cooperated or defected in the last move.
a two-person game defined by the payoff matrix
A =
(
3 0
5 1
)
= (aij)i,j ∈{1,2}, (1)
with the entries aij being the payoffs of agent 1 playing
strategy si against agent 2 using strategy sj (s1, cooperat-
ing; s2, defecting). In general, the entries aij have to fulfill
a12 < a22 < a11 < a21 and a12 + a21 < 2a11.
In the IPD, a strategy is interpreted as a map of an agent’s
knowledge to an action. Here, knowledge is defined by the
number of the m previous moves the agent can remember.
We will confine the strategy space to strategies with m = 1,
i.e., one agent knows only about the latest move of its oppo-
nent. At the beginning of an encounter, there is no previous
move. Therefore, the first action is also part of the strategy
(Table I). It can be viewed as a lookup table where each his-
tory is mapped to an action. In the case of m = 1, there
are 22
m
+1 = 8 possible strategies. The strategies “always de-
fect” (000) and “tit for tat” (011) are always Nash equilibria of
this finite normal form game. Initially, a random network of a
given average degree (i.e., number of a node’s next neighbors)
〈k〉 is generated resulting in a Poissonian degree distribution.
Strategies are assigned to the players at random. The coevo-
lutionary dynamics consists of one part for the evolution of
the strategies and another for network evolution. In each iter-
ation cycle the following steps take place. Strategy evolution:
(i) One agent i is chosen randomly and its strategy is mutated
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FIG. 1: Distribution P (M) of avalanche size M in the critical
regime. P (M) exhibits scale-free behavior with a scaling exponent
of γ = −1.35 ± 0.04. The inset shows the sub- and supercritical
regimes (N = 500, 〈k〉 = 5, a21 = 3.5, 5.0, 5.1).
to a strategy picked at random. (ii) The mutated agent plays
against its neighbors and its payoff is compared to its payoff
before the mutation. In case of a payoff increase the mutation
is accepted and the payoffs of all neighbors are updated. This
strategy update has been first used in Ref. [10]. Step (ii) cor-
responds to the assumptions that changing the strategy may
bear some costs (risk) for the player and that mutations occur
on a time scale slower than the time scale of the game. Net-
work evolution: (i) With probability α, one randomly chosen
agent i is connected to a new neighbor taken at random. (ii)
If the new connection leads to an increase in average payoff,
player i will accept the new connection and remove the link
to the neighbor it scores worst against. In case player i had no
neighbor before, it accepts the connection, and a link between
a random pair of players will be removed to keep the average
degree 〈k〉 constant [20]. Thereafter, all payoffs are updated.
Note that the information used by an agent (its own payoff) is
fully local.
The iteration of these steps eventually leads to stationary
states. The choice of the value of α that determines the speed
of network evolution is not critical and convergence has been
verified for values between α = 0.001 and 1. The station-
ary states, where no further increase in payoff is possible for
any agent, are cooperative and dominated by the strategy “tit
for tat” (011). With regard to strategies, the stationary states
correspond to game theoretic Nash equilibria [15]. Network
evolution here does not interfere with the notion of Nash equi-
libria. In a stationary state no player can improve its payoff,
neither by changing its strategy nor by choosing a different
neighborhood. In the remainder of this paper, such an equilib-
rium will be called a network Nash equilibrium.
One essential property of this spatially extended coevolu-
tionary game is the stability of the network Nash equilib-
ria. Exploring the IPD on static networks [10], perturbations
of the game’s Nash equilibria have been observed to cause
avalanches of M mutation events until stationary states are
reestablished. Depending on the crucial parameter of the
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FIG. 2: Degree distributions P (k) for critical (solid line, a21 = 5.0)
and subcritical (dotted line, a21 = 3.5) avalanche dynamics. The
dashed plot shows the initial Poissonian degree distribution. (N =
500, 〈k〉 = 20).
payoff matrix, the temptation to defect a21, three different
regimes of avalanche dynamics were found. First, for low
temptations, the distribution of avalanche size P (M) is sub-
critical with few mutation events necessary to reach again an
equilibrium. In an intermediate range of a21, scale-free be-
havior occurs as the distribution of avalanche size exhibits a
power law with exponent γ = −1.39± 0.10. For high values
of a21, the game becomes supercritical with a probability for
very large avalanches much higher compared to the critical
regime.
Let us similarly perturb the network Nash equilibrium by
randomly changing the strategy of an arbitrary player [21].
The deviating strategy offers new opportunities for strategy
changes to the neighboring players. The perturbation then can
spread which leads to an avalanche of mutation events. Addi-
tionally, payoff can be improved by changing one’s neighbor-
hood which results in a network evolution closely connected
to the strategy evolution of the individual agents.
One finds that the model with network dynamics considered
here results in a similar avalanche dynamics as observed for
the static network case. For temptations to defect a21 ≤ 4.8
and a21 ≥ 5.2, the subcritical and supercritical regimes
emerge (inset in Fig. 1). The critical regime exists in the
same range 4.9 ≤ a21 ≤ 5.1 as for static networks with
same mean degree (Fig. 1). In addition, the scaling exponent
γ = −1.35 ± 0.04 agrees with the static case. Surprisingly,
however, evolution of network structure is profoundly affected
by the avalanche dynamics.
After an avalanche, network evolution comes to an end
when a network Nash equilibrium is reached. The equilibrium
network, which emerges in the course of subsequent perturba-
tions and avalanches, strongly differs from the initial random
graph. For practical purposes we here speak of an equilibrium
network when the first three cumulants of the degree distribu-
tion do not change over a period of time much larger than the
time needed to reach these values. The first three cumulants
are given by the mean degree 〈k〉 (being constant because of
3〈k〉 a21 σ2 σ20 λ3 λ03
5 3.5 10.4(4) 5 0.964(74) 0.447
5 5.0 19.3(12) 5 1.22(13) 0.447
5 5.1 20.6(12) 5 1.39(13) 0.447
20 3.5 125(7) 20 0.873(89) 0.224
20 5.0 261(8) 20 0.753(72) 0.224
20 5.4 398(13) 20 0.906(36) 0.224
TABLE II: Cumulants of the degree distribution P (k) (N = 500,
errors are given by standard deviations).
〈k〉 a21 C∆ C′ C0 ℓ ℓ′ ℓ0 r
5 3.5 0.0164(21) 0.014 0.010 3.98(3) 3.9 3.55 0.047(22)
5 5.0 0.0298(36) 0.025 0.010 3.95(4) 3.2 3.55 0.115(25)
5 5.1 0.0329(39) 0.026 0.010 3.95(5) 3.2 3.55 0.125(23)
20 3.5 0.0651(25) 0.064 0.040 2.41(1) 2.0 2.07 0.006(11)
20 5.0 0.106(2) 0.10 0.040 2.55(2) 1.9 2.07 0.019(14)
20 5.4 0.162(7) 0.15 0.040 2.69(4) 1.9 2.07 0.064(18)
TABLE III: Clustering coefficient C∆, average shortest path length ℓ,
and Pearson coefficient r of the evolved networks (N = 500, errors
are given by standard deviations).
step (ii) of the network evolution process), the variance σ2 and
the skewness λ3 = 〈(k − 〈k〉)3〉/σ3. The stationary values of
the cumulants for different mean degrees and the three distinct
regimes of avalanche dynamics are given in Table II. Indepen-
dent of mean degree and temptation to defect, one observes a
strong broadening of the degree distribution, up to an increase
of the variance σ2 by a factor of 20 compared to the initial ran-
dom network with Poissonian degree distribution (σ20). The
skewness λ3 is significantly higher than expected for the Pois-
sonian distribution (λ03) indicating a more asymmetric distri-
bution with a longer tail to the right. The dependence of the
degree distribution on the different regimes of avalanche dy-
namics can be seen in Fig. 2 where the degree distributions for
critical and subcritical avalanche dynamics are plotted. In the
critical regime (and similarly in the supercritical regime), the
broad degree distribution resembles a power law. In the range
of 〈k〉 where critical dynamics are possible [10] the cutoff of
the degree distribution grows with increasing 〈k〉, whereas the
degree distribution is independent of the number of agents N .
Note that although the quantity selected for is the sum of the
payoffs an agent receives, it does not select for high number of
neighbors as the number of neighbors is kept constant for the
agent who decides. However, the agent who receives the link
appears to be more or less attractive depending on its strategy
and this reflects in the emerging link distribution.
Besides the degree distribution, important properties when
exploring a complex network’s topology are also clustering
and average shortest path length. The clustering coefficient
C∆ is a measure of the probability that two nodes share a
common neighbor [16]
C∆ =
3× (number of fully connected triples)
number of triples . (2)
C∆ is the fraction of fully connected triples, with a triple be-
ing a connected subgraph which contains exactly three nodes.
These values are compared to the clustering coefficient of a
Poissonian random network C0 and the clustering coefficient
C′ we derived for a random network with identical degree dis-
tribution but randomly assigned links [17]
C′ =
1
〈k〉N
(
〈k2〉
〈k〉
− 1
)2
. (3)
Comparison of the experimental clustering C∆ with C0
shows an enhanced clustering (Table III). Since C∆ is repro-
duced well by Eq. (3) the increase in clustering can be entirely
traced to the change of the degree distribution.
The average ℓ of the shortest path lengths between two
nodes is determined for the giant component of the network
always containing more than 95% of all nodes. Similarly
to the treatment of the clustering coefficient, shortest path
lengths for Poissonian random networks (ℓ0) and for random
networks with identical degree distributions (ℓ′) are calculated
[17]. The observed values of ℓ are slightly larger than the av-
erage shortest paths in a Poissonian random network resulting
in still very short paths between any two nodes in the network
(Table III). The estimate ℓ′ does not yield results as good as
C′ in the case of the clustering coefficient. Obviously, for the
shortest path length ℓ, the assumption of randomly assigned
links [16, 17] is not sufficient for an accurate estimate.
To gain further insight into the structure of the evolved net-
works, the Pearson coefficient r is calculated. It provides a
measure of the degree correlation between neighboring nodes
[18]
r =
1
σ2Q
∑
µ,ν
µν
(
Q(µ, ν)−Q(µ)Q(ν)
)
. (4)
Q(µ) is the distribution of the remaining degree µ (i.e., µ =
k − 1) and Q(µ, ν) the joint probability distribution that the
two nodes at the ends of a randomly chosen link have the re-
maining degrees µ and ν. A positive Pearson coefficient in-
dicates that nodes with a high degree prefer linking to other
highly connected nodes (assortative mixing). For r < 0 high
degree nodes tend to link to poorly connected agents (disas-
sortative mixing). No preference is given when such correla-
tions are absent, r = 0. The evolved networks studied here
are neutral in the subcritical avalanche regime, as expected
for the initial Poissonian random network (Table III). How-
ever, for critical and supercritical behavior, assortative mix-
ing is observed (comparable in size to the assortative mixing
of real-world graphs as, for example, co-authorship networks
[18]).
To summarize we have studied a model for a coevolution-
ary Prisoner’s Dilemma game on an evolving network where
4each agent is allowed to alter its neighborhood in order to en-
hance its payoff, thereby shaping the topology of the network.
One observes that the network, after an initial perturbation
and a subsequent avalanche of rearrangements, relaxes into a
stationary state which is stable w.r.t. strategy variations (Nash
equilibrium), as well as against local topology changes (net-
work Nash equilibrium). In this equilibrium, even a change of
topology cannot enhance any player’s payoff. While the dy-
namics of the relaxation process is similar to the correspond-
ing model on static networks without topology updates, the
equilibrium structure of the network, emerged in the course of
avalanches, strongly deviates from the initial random graph.
The network evolves to a statistically stationary state with a
broad degree distribution, suggesting scale-free behavior in
the critical avalanche regime. It exhibits small-world behavior
[19], and in the critical and supercritical regimes also shows
assortative mixing, a property of social networks not shared
by many standard models [18].
The spatial coevolutionary game studied here is a minimal
non-trivial model of network evolution driven by game theo-
retic interactions. It may help in understanding the emergence
of global organization from local interactions as observed in
social and economic systems. It also provides an alternative
mechanism for the evolution of complex networks possibly
relevant for real-world systems where simple growth models
as, for example, preferential linking [5], are not easily appli-
cable.
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